

~~PLAIN~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

**NON-CIA MESSAGE
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

S/S

NO.

18503

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICERS INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. <i>SE/FIR</i>		<i>27 JUN 1958</i>		<i>new</i>	<p><i>to 3: This is one you requested. (old)</i></p> <p>Contents of this document not to be revealed outside O/DDP Washington</p> <p>RECIPIENT OF THIS CABLE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING RECORD OF DESTRUCTION OR DISPOSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSI#51-11, 13 Aug. 1957</p>
2.					
<i>O/H</i>		<i>27 JUN 1958</i>			
<i>De/H</i>					
<i>ECPP</i>					
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<i>SE/FIR</i>					
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INCOMING TELEGRAM*Department of State*

42-48

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Action

Classification

Control: 19363

EUR

Rec'd: June 25, 1958

7:32 p.m.

Info

FROM: Belgrade

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1739, June 25, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1739, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 237,
PARIS 285, BONN 208, WARSAW 90, MOSCOW 287, ZAGREB,
SARAJEVO UNNUMBERED.

Department's 1031. Belgrade's 1715.

Responsible Yugoslavs recognize major error was made in recognizing East Germany and they would welcome resumption opportunity to reopen relations with Federal Republic. Influences this direction naturally strengthened by recent progressive deterioration of relations between Yugoslavia and Soviet bloc, and rumors that Yugoslavs were making gestures toward West Germans have failed of authoritative denial.

Other than for practical quid pro quo which Bonn would require from Yugoslavs, essence of problem for them is to find public situation in context of which Tito can reverse himself without publicly admitting he and his government made mistake in recognizing Pankow. French Embassy, representing Federal Republic interests in Belgrade, reports Yugoslavs have made it clear they would welcome situation permitting re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn but that no actual overtures made through French. French Counselor believes Adenauer press conference statement last week (we have not seen text) may help but that some substantive and public gesture must be made by Bonn or, alternatively, international situation must further evolve before Tito can take any initiative. Counselor continued that Yugoslavs fear if they proceed to downgrade their representation in Pankow, or go so far as to break off relations, Bulgaria Albania might seize excuse to sever relations with Belgrade thus exacerbating Tito's isolation from Communist bloc.

While we

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-2- 1739, June 25, 5 p.m., from Belgrade.

While we have elicited no further details from Yugoslav officials re Primozic proposition to Department on desirability ~~Bonn establishing relations with Warsaw~~, our own initial reaction paralleled that reflected in London's 7467 to Department to effect this informal Yugoslav initiative designed (A) push Bonn in direction many Yugoslav officials have long advocated as first step in diminishing Soviet influence in Poland and (B) creating international atmosphere in which Yugoslav gestures towards Bonn might be politically feasible.

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TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICERS INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. <i>Sc/FIR</i>	27 JUN 1958			<i>new</i>	
2.		27 JUN 1958			
3. <i>C/B</i>	27 JUN 1958			<i>hm</i>	
4. <i>De/HZ</i>					
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INCOMING TELEGRAM*Department of State*

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Action

Classification

Control: 19035

Rec'd: June 25, 1958

1:12 p.m.

EUR

Info

FROM: Paris

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 6154, June 25, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 6154 REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 186, BELGRADE
180, BONN 402

Foreign Office has shown us cable for French Ambassador Belgrade reporting his recent interview with Prica. Prica reportedly said Yugoslavs welcomed Adenauer's June 19 statement and hoped GFR would work toward "normalization" of relations between Yugoslavia and GFR. For immediate future, this would probably mean only increase in number of delegates exchanged between two countries. French Ambassador commented Yugoslavia would like to reestablish full relations with GFR but is reluctant to take initiative and preoccupied with "saving face".

Prica reportedly said Yugoslavia has no intention for present of withdrawing Yugoslav Minister from Pankow. However, he noted that this could be affected by future developments and that Khrushchev's acts seemed to be unpredictable.

HOUGHTON

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TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICERS INITIALS	COMMENTS
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1. <i>101 FIR</i>					
2.					
<i>C/12</i>		27 JUN 1958		<i>44</i>	
<i>DC/12</i>					
<i>101 CPD</i>					
<i>101 YB</i>					
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INCOMING TELEGRAM*Department of State*

42-48

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Action

Classification

Control: 20455

EUR

Rec'd: June 26, 1958

Info

7:30 p.m.

FROM: Bonn

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 3867, June 26, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 3867; REPEATED INFORMATION WARSAW 171, BELGRADE 124, MOSCOW 275, LONDON 452, PARIS 727.

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PARIS FOR EMBASSY AND USRO

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Reference: Department telegram 3267

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Since from point of view Polish-Soviet relations Poles obviously in best position determine desirability establishing full diplomatic relations with Federal Republic at this time, Embassy deliberately withheld comment on reference telegram until receiving Warsaw's 1843 to Department.

As Department aware, Federal Republic has moved cautiously on Polish recognition question because of Federal Republic position on GDR recognition, domestic considerations, boundary problem, and German appreciation possible consequences of western approach on Gomulka's relations with Soviets.

In view of current Communist campaign against Tito and "revisionists", and German belief that Nagy execution intended as Soviet warning to Poles (Embassy airgram G-284), Germans feel problem of relations with Poles at this juncture is extremely delicate.

As indicated in Embassy's D-2270 June 23, Federal cabinet actively considering Brentano proposal calling for negotiations leading to simultaneous exchange of trade missions (with consular rights and privileges) with both Poland and Czechoslovakia. According to Foreign Office sources, Brentano believes

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-2- 3867, June 26, 5 p.m. from Bonn

this formula satisfactory to German circles opposing formal Federal Republic recognition Soviet satellite, and not as likely arouse Soviet suspicions as exclusive political approach to Poles.

Despite reported Polish position that anything less than complete diplomatic relations with Federal Republic unacceptable and possibility that Czechs might not respond to German initiative at this time, Brentano is said to feel simultaneous approach to both regimes would give Poles some maneuverability in dealing with issue.

In light all available information we believe it highly inadvisable to try to push Germans at this time in direction closer relations with Poles. However, if Germans request it we might offer to ask Poles through American Embassy Warsaw their current views this subject.

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